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Machines Finding Injustice
Hannah S. Laqueur*
Ryan W. Copus**
ABSTRACT
With rising caseloads, review systems are increasingly taxed, stymieing
traditional methods of case screening. We propose an automated solution:
predictive models of legal decisions can be used to identify and focus review
resources on outlier decisions—those decisions that are most likely the product of biases, ideological extremism, unusual moods, and carelessness and
thus most at odds with a court’s considered, collective judgment. By using
algorithms to find and focus human attention on likely injustices, adjudication systems can largely sidestep the most serious objections to the use of
algorithms in the law: that algorithms can embed racial biases, deprive parties of due process, impair transparency, and lead to “technological–legal
lock-in.”
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INTRODUCTION
The implementation of law involves the discretion of an army of decentralized decision makers, including federal and state court judges, administrative law judges, patent examiners, asylum officers, and safety inspectors. But
it is well-documented that adjudicators suffer from cognitive biases, ideological blind spots, racial or gender bias, variation in moods, idiosyncrasy, and
carelessness in their decision making.1 As a result, not only are individual
cases poorly decided, but the implementation of law becomes less predictable. Individuals may spend more time in prison, lose on a sexual harassment
claim, or face deportation simply because they were assigned the wrong
judge at the wrong time.
Historically, adjudication systems have relied heavily on secondary (i.e.,
appellate) review to check and monitor the discretion granted to individual
decision-makers. Rather than allowing a single and perhaps cognitively biased, ideologically motivated, mood-driven, and careless decision-maker to
determine a party’s fate, a decision is subjected to review by a larger group
of decision-makers. Then that larger group’s decisions are often subject to
review by a yet larger group of adjudicators. For example, federal district
courts employ one judge to make an initial decision, these are reviewed by
circuit courts that employ panels of three, and this decision may be subject to
further review by nine judges at the Supreme Court or all of an appellate

Kevin Chen, Chance Grable-Hughes, Karalyn Lacey, Shivani Pandare, and
Wenjie Xu. Finally, we thank Jonathan Simon and the Berkeley Empirical
Legal Studies Fellows for their comments and feedback.
1.

A large body of research in the behavioral sciences has demonstrated a myriad
of biases in human judgment that can undermine accurate or fair reasoning. See
generally ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1988); RICHARD H.
THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991). Professional decisionmakers,
including judges, are not immune. Indeed, a range of experimental and observational studies have demonstrated the influence of non-legal factors in judicial
decisions, lending support to the legal trope that “justice is what the judge ate
for breakfast.” See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 203, 203 (2017). Recent research suggests, for example, that
the outcome of a football game, the results of the immediately preceding case,
and the time of day can substantially affect legal decisions. See Daniel Li Chen
et al., This Morning’s Breakfast, Last Night’s Game: Detecting Extraneous
Factors in Judging (IAST, Working Paper No. 16-49, 2016), https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tseiastwp/31020.htm. At a system level, studies have
shown stark disparities in the rates at which adjudicators grant asylum to refugees, Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 411 (2007); and provide social security
disability benefits, HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 1–2 (2013).
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court’s judges in an en banc panel.2 This general strategy of assigning cases
to successively larger groups of decision-makers is used in almost every adjudication system.3 The theory and hope is that larger bodies of adjudicators
are more resistant to biases and whims, allowing for more accurate and consistent decisions.4
However, there is a major limitation to relying on secondary review,
especially with the heavy caseloads that many modern adjudication systems
face: we cannot afford to provide every case the full attention of an adjudication system (i.e. not every case can be reviewed en banc), and we are not
very good at identifying the cases that should get review. With historically
heavy caseloads in almost every adjudication system, courts must employ
criteria to effectively and efficiently screen for the decisions that were most
likely made in error.5 Courts systems largely rely on an ad hoc mix of two
strategies.6 First, filing fees can leverage the litigant’s judgment regarding
error in the initial decision.7 But such a willingness-to-pay approach raise
concerns about inequality, and there is little indication that adjudication systems are willing to set filing fees anywhere close to the level at which they
would effectively screen for meritorious appeals.8 Second, courts can under2.

Introduction To The Federal Court System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts#:~:text=Introduction
%20To%20The%20Federal%20Court%20System%201%20District,3%20Supreme%20Court%20of%20the%20United%20States.%20 (last visited Apr. 8,
2021).

3.

There are some systems that rely on a single individual for review, but even
they only made the shift from multi-member review panels in response to overwhelming strains on resources. See, e.g., Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of the United
States) is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1580–81 (2015) (describing the Social Security Appeals
Council’s shift from en banc to individual review “because of the high volume
of work.”).

4.

See infra Section I.

5.

See, e.g., Mike Gallagher, Heavy Caseload, Judges’ Vacancies put NM Federal
Court Underwater, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Sept. 21, 2019, 11:45 PM), https://
www.abqjournal.com/1369388/heavy-caseloads-judges-vacancies-put-nm-federal-court-underwater.html; Olivia Covington, Report: Indiana Public Defender Caseload Standards Likely too High, THE INDIANA LAW. (July 28,
2020), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/report-indiana-public-defender-caseload-standards-likely-too-high.

6.

See Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of
Discretionary Review Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 63 (2010).

7.

Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 384 (1995).

8.

Id. at 421 n.79.
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take a tentative review in order to assess the likelihood of error and decide
whether to subject the initial decision to the full review process.9 But such
tentative review is costly, and its preliminary search for errors can be riddled
with errors of its own.
In this Article, we propose an algorithmic approach to improving review
processes and legal decision-making in an ethically and technically responsible manner. Specifically, we suggest using statistical predictions of a court’s
decision in any given case to prioritize review of outlier decisions that are
most at odds with a court’s considered, collective judgment. These algorithmic predictions of decision outcomes are effectively an estimate of the
percentage of judges that would disagree with a decision, were they to have
decided the case. Fine-tuning the screening mechanism for appellate review
means that courts, as currently structured, could spend more time correcting
their own errors. Further, it presents the possibility for restructuring adjudication systems around a much more effective appellate screening procedure.
Unlike algorithms currently being proposed and deployed in contexts
such as criminal justice system risk prediction,10 the algorithmic approach we
propose does not raise the same concerns of due process,11 impaired transparency, litigant gaming, and embedded biases.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the challenges associated with employing algorithms to help guide decisions, focusing in particular on the controversy over the use of actuarial risk assessment instruments
in the criminal justice system. Part II describes the promise and challenge of
using appellate review to correct aberrant legal decisions. Part III describes
the details of our general proposal to use predictive algorithms to more effectively screen cases for review.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS IN LAW
Data-driven algorithms derived through machine learning are making
inroads in diverse settings ranging from business to medical diagnoses,12 and
9.

See id. at 83–84.

10. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014).
11. Despite advances in computation power and computer science that have improved our ability to generate predictive algorithms, these developments have
not enhanced our ability to capture causes of (i.e., reasons for) an outcome.
Thus, even if algorithms can correctly forecast criminal risk, they fundamentally cannot provide an account of why a defendant was deemed high (or low)
risk. For more discussion, see infra Section II.A.
12.

See, e.g., James S. Moore, An Expert System Approach to Graduate School
Admission Decisions and Academic Performance Prediction, 26 OMEGA 659,
659 (1998) (applying machine learning methods to graduate admissions); Ziad
Obermeyer & Ezekiel J Emanuel, Predicting the Future – Big Data, Machine
Learning, and Clinical Medicine, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1216 (2016) (on the
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they have begun to enter the legal system primarily in the context of criminal
risk prediction.13 Jurisdictions across the country are increasingly deploying
risk prediction algorithms to aid in decision tasks such as setting bail, determining sentencing, and deciding whether or not to release on inmates on
parole.14 Algorithms promise to minimize human bias and the inconsistent
application of the law. At the same time, the use of risk prediction tools in
the criminal justice system has been a source of considerable controversy.15
Their growing deployment raises important technical and ethical questions
that we briefly describe below.
A. Due Process, Transparency, and Litigant Gaming
A core complaint regarding the use of predictive algorithms in criminal
justice decisions is that they inherently conflict with due process rights to an
individualized assessment and explanation.16 When a judge makes a decision,
she can provide intelligible explanations and justifications for the decision in
the particular case. This might include reasoning that because the defendant
committed multiple violent crimes in the recent past, she believes he is likely
to commit violence again and therefore poses a danger to society in the near
future and should be incarcerated. While such justifications may or may not
reliably describe a judge’s internal thought process, we can at least hold
judges accountable for providing some plausible justification. Predictive algorithms, on the other hand, do not, at least directly, provide such a justification. A defendant is labeled “high risk” because of a potentially complex set
of statistical relationships between predictor variables and criminal offending, proxied by arrest or conviction. Inherently, a statistical model does not
provide a justification for a given individual defendant. The justification for a
decision guided by a predictive algorithm necessarily occurs at an aggregate
and more abstract level. Because these statistical predictions can be more
accurate than the predictions of judges,17 we recommend that judges consider
the risk score in making their prediction. This level of justification is one

promise of machine learning for medicine); Zhenning Xu et al., Effects of Big
Data Analytics and Traditional Marketing Analytics on New Product Success:
A Knowledge Fusion Perspective, 69 J. BUS. RES. 1562, 1564 (2016) (describing the rise of algorithms in commercial settings).
13.

See Starr, supra note 10.

14.

Id.

15.

See, e.g., Greg Ridgeway, The Pitfalls of Prediction, 271 NAT’L INST. OF JUST.
J. 34, 35 (2013).

16.

See, e.g., Anne L. Washington, How to Argue With an Algorithm: Lessons
From the Compas-Propublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131, 140–42
(2018).

17. See Zhiyuan Lin, The Limits of Human Predictions of Recindivism, SCI. ADVANCE, Feb. 2020, at 1, 1.
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society may or may not be willing to tolerate, and there remains ongoing
scholarly debate as to whether it is incompatible with due process rights.18
The concern that statistical models cannot provide an individual justification because they rely on averages and correlations is heightened by the
fact that predictive algorithms built with machine learning are inherently
“black boxes,” meaning we can see the input and the output, but what happens in between is opaque.19 Machine learning generally affords superior
predictive performance over simple regressions by better capturing complex
relationships between variables, but the cost is that its formulas are much
harder to interpret than simple linear regression model.20
The black box problem is further exacerbated by the fact that algorithms, at least as they are currently implemented, are often completely hidden from litigants and the public.21 Many of the risk assessment instruments
currently in use in the criminal justice system have been developed not by the
state but by private companies who argue that the specific statistical formulas
used to determine risk are proprietary, and thus shielded from review by the
public.22 Thus, the problem for due process becomes not simply that statistical models cannot provide individual-level justification, or that machine
learning algorithms are difficult to explain statistically (the “black box” problem), but that the formulas used are hidden from those to whom they are
applied.
Recent litigation has highlighted this unresolved legal issue. In Loomis
v. Wisconsin, Loomis argued his due process rights were violated when the
sentencing court relied on the Correctional Offender Management Profiling
for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) criminal-risk instrument in his sentencing because proprietary nature of COMPAS prevented him from verifying or
challenging the algorithm’s accuracy and scientific validity and failed to pro-

18. See, e.g., Katherine Freeman, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 75,78 (2016).
19.

See Erin E. Kenneally, Gatekeeping Out of the Box: Open Source Software as a
Mechanism to Assess Reliability for Digital Evidence, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 13,
14 (2001).

20.

See Eric Vardon, Machine Learning vs. Predictive Analytics: Which is Better
for Business, FORBES (June 12, 2020, 8:20 EDT), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbesagencycouncil/2020/06/12/machine-learning-vs-predictive-analytics
-which-is-better-for-business/?sh=777a83cb4b5e (discussing the use of machine learning for business analytics).

21. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1254 (2008) (“The opacity of automated systems shields them from scrutiny.
Citizens cannot see or debate these new rules. In turn, the transparency, accuracy, and political accountability of administrative rulemaking are lost.”).
22. Id. at 1290.
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vide him an individualized sentence.23 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held
the trial court’s use of the algorithmic risk assessment did not violate due
process rights even though the algorithm used to produce the assessment was
not disclosed.24 The court reasoned that the defendant could evaluate the accuracy of the data (all publicly available) used in the algorithm’s construction.25 In 2017, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari.26
Although companies have generally argued that their algorithmic formulas cannot be revealed simply because they are proprietary, there is perhaps a more serious objection to full transparency: given public access,
parties might be able to adapt to models in ways that undermine model accuracy.27 The problem of litigant adaptation comes in two forms. First, users of
the legal system may be able to strategically alter their “input variables” so as
to obtain more favorable algorithmic recommendations. Second, public access could result in parties entering adjudication systems that they would not
have entered absent knowledge of the algorithm, which could create a disjunct between the population upon which an algorithm was built and the
population to which it is applied. Consider an inmate who, absent an algorithm, would have chosen to defer his parole hearing because of his correct
belief that parole commissioners would have judged him unsuitable for release. Despite the inmate’s weak case for parole, he may share some characteristics with inmates who have a low recidivism score. Knowledge of his
algorithmic recommendation might convince the inmate to proceed with his
scheduled parole hearing. In such a case, the model would incorrectly inform
commissioners that the inmate has a low probability of recidivism.
B. Embedded Bias
The second set of concerns regarding predictive algorithms center
around their potential to embed biases while appearing to produce scientifically objective results. Much of the current debate centers around concerns
regarding algorithms reproducing and exacerbating racial bias.28 There are
23. Wisconsin v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016).
24. Id. at 772.
25. Id. at 761–62. Regarding the problem of individualized sentencing, the court
acknowledged the concern that COMPAS scores only provide predictions
based on group aggregations, but the problem was lessened because courts
have the discretion to not follow risk score recommendations. Id. at 764–65.
26. Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
27. Michael A. Livermore, Rule by Rules, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES:
THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH (Ryan
Whalen ed., 2020).
28.

See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing.
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also fundamental statistical and technical biases that can corrupt the validity
of predictive algorithms. We briefly describe both the technical and normative bias concerns.
The first technical issue is the problem of “selective labels.”29 The crux
of the problem is the mismatch between the dataset used to build an empirical risk prediction algorithm and the set of individuals to whom the algorithm
is applied.30 For example, consider an algorithm used to assist parole decisions. The model is fit on a dataset of individuals granted parole—the group
for which there will be data on subsequent offending—but the model is applied to all parole-eligible inmates. The information about paroled individuals (that was used to develop the prediction algorithm) may not provide
accurate forecasts for individuals that a parole board would not have paroled.
Judges do not, presumably, release observably similar individuals randomly,
so there is reason to worry about the application of forecasts of paroled inmates to the entire population of parole-eligible inmates.31
A second concern, and one that intersects with concerns of racial bias, is
the problem of measurement. Risk assessment models in the criminal justice
system aim to forecast future criminal behavior, but criminal behavior can
only be measured imperfectly with administrative data on arrests or convictions. Understanding the outcome measure upon which a predictive algorithm was built, and its limitations, is critical to evaluating the validity of a
predictive algorithm.32 Predictive algorithms can only be as good as the underlying data upon which they are trained.33 For example, an algorithm built
using any arrest as the outcome, including low level violations for drug possession or loitering, may result in a risk assessment that is not accurately
assessing serious criminal or violent risk, often the real interest of decisionmakers. Further, it may produce artificially high-risk scores for individuals in
heavily policed areas, areas that are often disproportionately black and Latino. For example, there is as evidence that suggests black men are more

29. Himabindu Lakkaraju et al., The Selective Labels Problem: Evaluating Algorithmic Predictions in the Presence of Unobservables, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
23RD ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 275, 275 (2017).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 277.
32. See Matt Henry, Risk Assessment: Explained, THE APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/risk-assessment-explained/#:~:text=A%20risk%20assessment%20that%20is,commit%20crimes%20in%20the%20past.
33. See Vikram Singh Bisem, How to Ensure Data Quality for Machine Learning
and AI Projects, MEDIUM (Dec. 17, 2019), https://medium.com/vsinghbisen/
how-to-ensure-data-quality-for-machine-learning-and-ai-projectsc8af1fe18c57.
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likely to be caught for drug possession than their white counterparts.34 A risk
instrument built using outcomes that included arrests for drug possession will
generate erroneously inflated risk scores for black males. Similarly, if black
men are more frequently penalized for technical parole violations, a measure
of reoffending that includes such violations of parole will unfairly increase
risk scores for black men.
Beyond concerns that input or output data in an algorithm may be biased or inaccurate, some have objected to algorithms in the criminal justice
system on the principle that they amount to computerized racial profiling.35
Whether race itself, or variables that are correlated with race, are used in a
model, algorithms by definition make statistical generalizations about groups
that may or may not apply to any given individual. Legal scholars such as
Sonia Starr have argued statistical sentencing based on gender and socioeconomic characteristics is unconstitutional: “the Supreme Court has squarely
rejected statistical discrimination—use of group tendencies as a proxy for
individual characteristics—as permissible justification for otherwise constitutionally forbidden discrimination.”36
Concerns about biased algorithms have raised corresponding questions
and debate as to what would constitute a “fair” algorithm. In perhaps the
most widely publicized analysis of risk assessments and their potential for
bias, in 2016 ProPublica reported that COMPAS sentencing recommendations were racially biased, generating more false positives for black defendants than white defendants (i.e., the algorithm incorrectly predicted that black
defendants would reoffend more often than it incorrectly predicted that white
defendants would reoffend).37 In light of the ProPublica analysis, recent
scholarship has formalized notions of algorithmic fairness—calibration
(white and black defendants with equal scores reoffend at equal rates), predictive equality (equal false positive rates by race), and statistical parity

34. See, e.g., A Tale of Two Countries: Racially Targeted Arrests in the Era of
Marijuana Reform, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 17, 2020), https://
www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/a-tale-of-two-countries-raciallytargeted-arrests-in-the-era-of-marijuana-reform/ (“The proof is in the data: Nationwide, Black people are 3.6 times more likely than white people to be arrested for marijuana, despite similar usage rates.”).
35.

See, e.g., Taylor Mooney & Grace Baek, Is Artificial Intelligence Making Racial Profiling Worse?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:19 AM), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling-2-0-cbsn-originals-documentary/ (“[D]uring the public comment period at a police commission meeting reviewing the audit, a community member voiced his concerns that
location-based predictive policing is a covert way to justify racial profiling.”).

36.

See Starr, supra note 10, at 827.

37. Angwin et al., supra note 28.
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(equal detention rates by race)—and shown that they cannot all be satisfied at
once.38
Of course, when considering the potential for algorithms to be biased, it
is important to consider the alternative. Human decisions can also be biased,
and perhaps more so.39 Conversations regarding the normative bias of algorithms have largely neglected the question of how algorithms compare to the
alternative.40 At the same time, biases embedded in algorithms may be particularly troubling because algorithms have the potential to be easily deployed
at a large scale.41 Furthermore, while bias in human decisions is naturally
corrected as societal norms progress, algorithms pose a danger of automating
and cementing historical norms, making bias resistant to societal progress.42
C. Outcome Models are Not Generalizable
Finally, even if the above problems with algorithms could be overcome,
the algorithmically guided decision-making is not applicable to many legal
domains because in most legal contexts there is not a plausible proxy for the
“correct” or “good” decision upon which to develop an algorithm.43 Unlike
the criminal justice system, where risk prediction is centrally embedded in
much of the decision-making, it is less clear what outcome proxy could significantly help a judge decide whether, for example, a workplace was a hostile environment, a contract was breached, or an individual is entitled to
social security disability.
The proposal we detail in Part III provides a strategy for employing
predictive algorithms that can be extended to all adjudication systems and
largely overcomes the objections described above. Rather than algorithms
being used to guide judicial decisions, this alternative use employs algorithms to find and funnel appellate resources to those decisions that are most
incompatible with the court’s collective judgment. More specifically, we pro38. Joe Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk
Scores 67 INNOVATIONS IN THEORHETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONFERENCE 43:1,
43:17 (2017).
39. See, e.g., Joe Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25548, 2019) NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RSCH., https://www.nber.org/papers/w25548.
40.

See Michael Li, Addressing the Biases Plaguing Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV.
(May 13, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/addressing-the-biases-plaguingalgorithms.

41. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent
Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 255 (2019).
42. Rebecca Crootof, Cyborg Justice and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In,
119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233, 235 (2019).
43. See Leslie Green & Thomas Adams, Legal Positivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 17, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/.
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pose targeting appellate review at those decisions that deviate most from a
data-driven forecast of a court’s decision. But we first briefly discuss the
promise and problems of appellate review.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Foundational to most adjudication systems is a process of secondary
review.44 An initial decision, generally made by a single or small group of
individuals, is reviewed by a larger group of individuals. Secondary review
serves two main functions: error correction and law development.45 The focus of this essay is on error correction, although the general framework can
be extended to law development as well.46
On what theories does the idea that secondary review aids error correction rest? In other words, what justifies the belief that an appellate decision is
more likely to remedy an initial error as opposed to simply affirming a lowercourt error or, worse, introducing error where there was none before? We
identify four main justifications for such a belief.
First, because appellate decisions are generally made by multi-member
panels, judges are afforded the opportunity to deliberate and contribute diverse perspectives to a given decision. Deliberation can help prevent ill-considered decisions by demanding that judges provide reasoned accounts for
their views and test their ideas against one another. This exchange of ideas
and information can sharpen arguments and result in better judgments.47
Second, even without deliberation, multi-member decision-making may
yield superior judgments simply as a function of the intrinsic value of judgment aggregation. The most explicit articulation of this theory is Condorcet
Jury Theorem, which has been offered as way to understand the widespread
belief that a multiplicity of judges will produce “better” decisions than any

44. See J. Dickson Phillips Jr., The Appellate Review Funciton: Scope of Review,
47 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 1, 1 (1984).
45. See Marin Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 424–429 (2013); Shavell, supra note 7,
at 379.
46.

See Ryan Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND.
L. REV. 605, 628 (2020).

47. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 447 (2007); Cass R.
Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (2005). While there are virtues to deliberation, it has also been argued that deliberation can impair the quality of decision-making insofar as group decision-making may devolve into “groupthink”
in which groups will tend toward uniformity and censorship or group polarization in which camps will come to simply ignore each other. See id. at 965.
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single individual judge.48 The central idea of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is
that a group operating under majority rule is more likely to make an accurate
decision than any random member of the group deciding alone.49
Third, because secondary review is structured such that only a fraction
of initial decisions are subject to review, courts can invest greater resources
(in addition to more judges) in the review stage. For example, with lighter
caseloads, courts might be able to select higher-quality judges, hire additional help (e.g., law clerks, staff attorneys, and other aides), and allow decision-makers to spend more time with each case.50
Finally, insofar as the appellate screening mechanism is effective, secondary review will tend to correct errors irrespective of any decision-making
advantages enjoyed by an appellate tribunal. For example, if we imagine a
screening mechanism that was so effective as to only allow errors into the
review system, reviewers could reduce errors by simply flipping coins to
make case decisions.51 And with fewer cases to review, courts could increase
the panel size to take advantage of deliberation and judgment aggregation.52
Currently, there are two broad approaches to determining which cases to
provide with secondary review. One general approach is to rely on barriers to
appeal, such that only parties who believe they have a good chance of prevailing on appeal will undertake the costs of advancing to the appellate
stage.53 Approaches of this type seek to leverage the private information litigants have about the merits of their own cases.54 Such barriers include filing
fees and indirect costs such as extensive paperwork and long delays.55 The
48. See Louis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 98 n.20 (1986); Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 327, 327 (2002).
49. Franz Dietrich, The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem are not Simultaneously Justified, 5 EPISTEME 56, 56 (2008). In the classic form, this is shown to
hold true so long as each individual’s probability of making the right decision
is greater than fifty percent, and the group members’ votes are cast independently of one another. Recent work has shown this assumption can be relaxed—one need only to assume that the average of the individuals’
probabilities is greater than 0.5 for the central insight of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to apply. See id. at 60.
50. Copus, supra note 46, at 636.
51. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem holds true so long as each reviewer’s probability of
being correct is greater than fifty percent. So, if only errors are reviewed, the
number of erroneously-decided cases would logically decrease if at least fifty
percent of the errors were corrected via coin flips. See Dietrich, supra note 49,
at 60.
52. Copus, supra note 46, at 647–48.
53. See Shavell, supra note 6, at 64.
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 69–70.
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second general approach is to rely on some form of preliminary assessment
by the court to determine whether an initial decision has a reasonable
probability of being reversed.56 For example, the United States Courts of Appeals hires a vast array of central staff to review cases and determine which
ones are worthy of assignment to actual judges.57 Both approaches—barriers
to appeal and preliminary review—have substantial limitations.
Raising the cost of appeal raises obvious equity concerns. Further, indirect costs can involve considerable social waste.58 Whether or not these issues are significant enough to warrant abandoning cost as a screening
mechanism, adjudication systems are reluctant to fully exploit the costs of
appeal as the primary screening tool. For example, filing fees in the federal
and state appellate courts are almost certainly too low to encourage effective
self-screening by litigants.59
Engaging in some form of preliminary assessment to screen for meritorious cases is time consuming and costly.60 Additionally, preliminary assessments made by central staff are likely to be, by virtue of being preliminary,
inaccurate. They are necessarily conducted under suboptimal conditions, perhaps by individuals who are not even judges, without extensive research or
reflection, and with little oversight.61
In summary, there are serious limitation to current strategies for separating the cases that need additional review from those that do not need it.
Algorithms can help.
III. PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
We propose an algorithm in which the target of the prediction is a judicial decision. The algorithm is trained on a court’s historical decision outcomes and can then predict what the court’s decision would be on new case
data. Such an algorithm can be thought of as “synthetic” crowdsourcing: it
aggregates judgments across and within decision-makers, leveraging the wisdom of the crowd and cancelling out arbitrary and contingent factors to minimize inter- and intra-judge inconsistency.62 This noise-purified model of
56. Id. at 69.
57. Levy, supra note 45, at 416.
58. See Shavell, supra note 6, at 92–93.
59. See id. at 95; see also Shavell, supra note 7, at 421 n.79.
60. See Shavell, supra note 6, at 69–70.
61. For example, appeals by pro se litigants are frequently assessed by staff attorneys rather than Article III judges. RICHARD POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY
PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL ARGUMENTS 8 (2017).
62. We present the case for the guiding dichotomous outcomes, but the framework
could be straightforwardly extended to continuous outcomes. In fact, continuous outcomes provide a particularly promising context, as they provide a more
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decision-making produces what is effectively the collective judgment of a
court,63 and we argue that it can be used to identify decisions that are most
incompatible with the court’s general jurisprudence.
In what follows, we elaborate on the core intuition that the algorithm
can be understood as simulating a world in which each judge casts multiple
independent votes in every case, explain how to best pursue the simulation
effort, and suggest how the results from the simulation can improve decisionmaking systems in a technically and ethically responsible manner.
A. The Simulation Goal
As described in the preceding section, a core goal of appellate review is
to correct errors.64 At the same time, with rise of legal realism has come the
consensus that there is rarely an objectively correct concept of “error.”65 We
thus adopt a non-substantive and realist view of error: a decision is made in
error if most judges would think it is. Of course, it is possible that, even if all
judges would believe a particular decision was made in error, someone else
might vigorously argue that it is correct. Arguments in favor of underrepresented conceptions of error are no doubt important to the progress of
justice. But the appellate system is structured so as to enforce the consensus
view—secondary review allows judges to address decisions that, in the view
of a broader set of judges, are wrong. Similarly, we take as our goal not to
advance our own idiosyncratic views of justice but to help courts advance
accurate measurement of judicial judgment. With dichotomous outcomes, a one
or a zero (e.g., a grant or deny) does not let us know how confident the judge’s
assessment is. For example, we don’t know whether a grant was just barely a
grant or whether it was a decisive grant.
63. Our approach is an extension of judgmental bootstrapping, an idea conceived in
the early 1900s in relation to predicting corn crop quality and later developed
in a variety of fields in the 1960s. In a 1971 review of the research, Robyn
Dawes coined the term “bootstrapping.” HANS G. DAELLENBACH & ROBERT L.
FLOOD, THE INFORMED STUDENT GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 158 (2002).
The central insight is that the fitted values from a regression model of expert
judgments, by eliminating the uninformative variance or noise, will often correlate higher with predicting the outcome variable than the actual expert judgments themselves.
64. Levy, supra note 45, at 424–25.
65. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988)
(“We are all realists now . . . All major current schools of thought are, in
significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all realists
now.”); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms—
American and Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 131 (2002) (“ ‘We are all
Realists now,’ as the saying goes.”); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267
(1997) (beginning the essay with the “cliché” that “we are all legal realists
now”).
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their own conceptions of justice. Thus, the aim is to identify those decisions
that are most at odds with a court’s collective judgment so that the court can
correct those decisions through an appellate process.66
More specifically, the decision-predictive algorithm can be viewed as
mimicking a hypothetical but normatively appealing world where, in each
case, each judge independently casts multiple independent votes under a variety of conditions (e.g., after her football team won, after her football team
lost, in the morning, in the afternoon etc.) and case outcomes are determined
by the aggregation of voting results. Such a world is normatively appealing
for two reasons. First, it allows us to remain agnostic with respect to the
value of different judges’ decisions. We avoid potentially contentious debates and instead rely on the appeal of democratic principles. Second, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, the classic theorem of political science and
antecedent to the “wisdom of the crowds,”67 provides normative grounding
for this approach: as long as decision-makers are, on average, making good
decisions, then a world with more independent votes will generate better
decisions.68
Of course, in reality, such a hypothetical world is unobtainable. Requiring all judges to participate multiple time in every case would be prohibitively expensive and even absurd. But we can statistically simulate such a

66. See Levy, supra note 45, at 424–25.
67. The “wisdom of crowds” refers to the idea that the aggregated predictions from
a large group of people will often be more accurate than most individual judgments. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS, at xiv (2004). The classic example
comes from Galton, who attended a regional fair at which 800 people each
guessed the weight of an ox. The average of the guesses was just one pound
away from the ox’s true weight. Francis Galton, Letters to the Editor: The
Ballot-Box, 75 NATURE 509, 509 (1907).
68. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality,
and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996). The
central idea of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is that a group operating under majority rule is more likely to make an accurate decision than any random member of the group deciding alone. Id. In the classic form, Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem holds true so long as (1) each individual’s probability of making the
right decision is greater than fifty percent; and (2) the group members’ votes
are cast independently of one another. Id. The requirement that all individuals
must have a probability of making the right decision greater than 0.5 can be
relaxed considerably: one only need to assume that the average of the individuals’ probabilities is greater than 0.5 for the central insight of Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem to apply. Id. A key feature of the theorem is that the probability that a
group will make an accurate decision increases as the size of the group increases. Id. Intuitively, if votes tend to be correct, then more votes are better
because any one vote might be randomly mistaken.
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world, and we can use the results of that simulation to identify decisions that
deviate from that normative ideal.
The core idea of the decision predictive algorithm is to remove the influence of factors that are randomly, or as-if randomly assigned by adjudication systems that should not have bearing on the case outcome. Consider a
simple world where there are three types of cases: X, Y, and Z. Litigants in
type X cases receive a favorable ruling ninety percent of the time. The ten
percent unfavorable rulings occur when a type X case happens to be assigned, for example, to a particularly harsh judge, to a judge in a particularly
harsh mood, or to a judge who feels pressure to deliver an unfavorable ruling
after a succession of favorable rulings in his previous five cases. In contrast,
litigants in type Y cases receive a favorable ruling only ten percent of the
time, by virtue of assignment to a particularly lenient judge, to a judge in a
particularly lenient mood, or to a judge who feels pressure to deliver a
favorable ruling after a succession of unfavorable rulings in her previous five
cases. Litigants in type Z cases receive favorable rulings fifty percent of the
time—judicial assessments are more contested in type Z cases. Our basic
contention is two-fold. First, a court should prioritize reviewing unfavorable
rulings in X cases and favorable rulings in Y cases if its goal is error-correction.69 Second, machine-learning algorithms are a powerful tool for helping
courts identify X, Y, and Z cases, as well as the nearly infinite types of cases
that inhabit real-world adjudication systems.70
B. The Simulation Technique
The technique we propose for constructing the decision predictive algorithm to identify cases for a review is a machine-learning extension of
“judgmental bootstrapping.” Though the term was coined by Robyn Dawes
in 1971, the concept stems from the early 1900s and was developed in a
variety of fields during the 1960s.71 The core idea is that we can build “a
model of an expert by regressing his forecasts against the information that he
used in order to infer the rules that the expert is using.”72 Scholars in disciplines ranging from psychology, education, marketing, and finance have applied judgmental bootstrapping to contexts ranging from school admissions

69. See Copus, supra note 46, at 629. If a court’s goal is law development, Type Z
cases may be the law proper target of the court’s attention. Id. at 633.
70. H.D. Hughes, An Interesting Seed Corn Experiment, 17 IOWA AGRICULTURIST
424, 424–25 (1917).
71. J. Scott Armstrong, Judgmental Bootstrapping: Inferring Experts’ Rules for
Forecasting, in J.S. ARMSTRONG, PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING 171, 173 (J.
Scott Armstrong ed., 2001).
72. Hannah Laqueur & Ryan Copus, Synthetic Crowdsourcing: A Machine-Learning Approach to Inconsistency in Adjudication (Dec. 6, 2017) (manuscript at
11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694326.
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decisions,73 predicting loan defaults,74 criminal sentencing appeals decisions,75 forecasting the number of advertising pages a magazine will sell,76
and making draft picks in sports leagues.77
The use of multivariate regression to model an expert’s reasoning process can be effective. Indeed, studies suggest that judgmental bootstrapping
models outperform the experts’ actual judgments in a wide variety of contexts.78 However where decision-making requires nuanced judgments, its
shortcomings can be stark.79 Most importantly, we often have no ability to
measure much of the information that judges use in a complex decision
task.80 Without that information, judgmental bootstrapping will often be unable to accurately model decision-making.81
We instead suggest using machine learning methods. A machine-learning approach aims not to model the expert’s decision rules, but instead to
produce results that make it only seem as if it has discovered the expert’s
decision rules.82 The aim is to merely predict how a collective court would
decide a case. Machine learning algorithms can search over rich combina73. Robyn M. Dawes, A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Application of Three
Principles of Human Decision Making, 26 AM. PSYCHOL. 180, 183–85 (1971).
74. Rashad A. Abdel-Khalik & Kamal M. El-Sheshai, Information Choice and
Utilization in an Experiment on Default Prediction, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 325, 342
(1980).
75. Duncan I. Simester & Roderick J. Brodie, Forecasting Criminal Sentencing
Decisions, 9 INT’L J. FORECASTING 49, 60 (1993).
76. Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Demand Forecasting: Evidence-Based
Methods, (Oct. 2012) (manuscript at 6–7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063308.
77. Armstrong, supra note 71, at 172.
78. Id. at 178.
79. Laqueur & Copus, supra note 72, at 11; Simester & Brodie, supra note 75, at
49.
80. Fred Collopy et al., Expert Systems for Forecasting, in ARMSTRONG, supra note
71, at 17.
81. Armstrong, supra note 71, at 174.
82. This distinction between the linear model of parametric bootstrapping and the
machine learning predictive approach are at the heart of recent shifts in computer scientific thinking with respect to Artificial Intelligence. Take, for example, the development of Google Translate. As one organizers of the Watson
project explain: “the traditional symbolic AI approach to translating documents
from one language to another proved ineffective. There are simply too many
exceptions to the ‘rules’ governing how humans use languages for it to be
practical to try to capture them all. . . . What big data and statistical machine
learning techniques have shown us is that given enough data many of these
problems can be solved to a large degree, absent deep understanding, by looking for patterns in the data.” Big Data, Statistical Machine Learning Tech-
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tions of variables, finding the combination that makes predictions most
accurate.83
Importantly, we dispense with any restriction that the model includes
only variables actually used by the decision-makers, and we instead exclude
only the noise variables—those variables that we have good reason to believe
are statistically unrelated to the actual merits of a case. These variables may
include the judge to which one happens to be assigned, the results of the
immediately preceding cases, the time of day, whether the judge’s football
team won the night before, the weather, and the judge’s mood. By excluding
these variables, predictions are averaged over the arbitrary circumstances that
often influence case outcomes.
Building a model with machine learning rather than traditional linear
regression methods not only allows for better predictions, but it also has the
benefit of separating the predictive task from potentially controversial normative choices. The traditional regression approach puts modeling choices in
the hands of the analyst. Different statistical models may generate different
outcomes and thus leaves room for manipulation, whether or not intentional.
A machine learning approach lets the data determine which model or combination of models generates the best predictions.84
C. Implementation: Machine-Guided Triage
Once a prediction algorithm is constructed, it can then be used to generate case-specific predictions of a favorable ruling, with predictions ranging
between 0 and 1. By simply taking the absolute difference between the actual
decision (e.g. a grant of parole coded as 1 or denial of parole coded as 0) and
the prediction (e.g. a predicted grant rate of 0.1 parole), courts could rank
decisions for prioritized review, with decisions having the largest difference
at the top of the list. We refer to that difference as a decision’s estimated
“degree of error,”85 which represents the estimated percentage of judges that
would disagree with a decision. For example, imagine there is an asylum
case with a 0.95 predicted probability of asylum being granted. If such a case
were indeed granted, it would have an estimated degree of error of 0.05 (10.95). Such a low score is an indication that there is little reason to prioritize
appellate review of that decision—most judges, most of the time, would
agree that the asylum should be granted. But if asylum were instead denied?
The decision would have a high estimated degree of error of 0.95, an indicaniques, and Machine Translation, LA. TECH WATSON (2014), http://watson.la
tech.edu/book/intelligence/intelligenceOverview5b1.html.
83.

See Copus, supra note 46, at 637–38.

84. We recommend going even further to assure model impartiality and transparency. Adjudication systems should hold public competitions and evaluate
algorithms solely on their predictive capacity. For discussion of this point, see
id. at 661.
85.

Id. at 629.
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tion that something has gone wrong and that the decision should be prioritized for review.
This algorithmic approach could be used as a standalone tool for appellate screening or combined with traditional screening tools—filing fees and
preliminary assessments—that are already in place. For example, courts
could increase filing fees as the degree of error decreases so as to discourage
meritless appeals while still providing confident litigants with a way to override an inaccurate algorithmic assessment. Courts could also intensify the
resources and attention spent on their preliminary assessment as the degree of
error increases. Courts could thus make sure to catch those cases with a high
degree of error, while still relying on human intervention to remedy obvious
errors that are incorrectly given low error scores by the algorithm.
Note that, in some adjudication systems, the set of judges that make
initial decisions and the set of the judges that review those initial decisions
are not the same judges.86 Although the ultimate goal is to identify cases that
the reviewing judges would reverse, the decision predictive algorithm should
nonetheless be constructed using the collective judgment of the lower-level
judges. The reason is two-fold. First, the larger sample size of the lower
courts will allow for more accurate predictions.87 Second, and most importantly, modeling the lower court allows for a match between the sample of
cases used to build the model and the set of cases to which the model is
applied (i.e., the lower-court cases). In contrast, if the model were built on
appellate cases, there would be a mismatch between the data use to build the
model and the population of lower-court cases that the model is applied to.
There would be little reason to expect that a model built on appellate cases
could be usefully applied to the set of lower-court cases. Thus, even where
there are moderate departures between judicial views in the two levels, these
benefits still counsel modeling the decisions of the lower court.88
D. The Virtues of Decision Predictive Algorithms as a Screening
Tool
Using predictive models of judicial decisions to prioritize cases for review effectively overcomes the standard objections to the use of algorithms
86. Introduction to the Federal Court System, supra note 2.
87. Supervised machine learning algorithms are “data hungry.” See, e.g., Ignacio
Olmeda & Pauline J. Sheldon, Data Mining Techniques and Applications for
Tourism Internet Marketing, 11 J. TRAVEL & TOURISM MARKETING 1, 16
(2008). That is, they work most effectively by sifting through large numbers of
variables, looking for combinations that reliably predict outcomes. They therefore demand more data than parametric techniques and generally, the more data
available the better the algorithm will perform. Alon Halevy et al., The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data, 24 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS. 8, 8 (2009).
88. Where the lower and upper court views depart significantly, there is less need
for any type of screening—insofar as the lower court is systematically at odds
with the higher court, any appeal is more likely to result in a reversal.
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in the legal system. First, it significantly mitigates the problems of technical
bias.89 Recall that models based on events external to an adjudication system,
like those that predict whether an individual will offend, are plagued by
problems of measurement. If the crimes of some groups are more likely to be
detected than other groups, their algorithmically-assessed risk will be artificially inflated. There is no such mismeasurement problem when the target of
the prediction is a judicial decision—administrative records should make it
trivial to accurately collect data on the outcomes of cases. Moreover, because
we can observe an outcome for each case in an adjudication system, a model
of decisions can bypass the selective labels problem.90
Second, employing algorithms to screen for likely errors rather than to
guide merit decisions mitigates due process concerns.91 As a matter of logic,
the appellate screening process is relatively light on due process: a comprehensive, individualized assessment of each case’s merits would amount to a
full appellate hearing for each case. But a fundamental function of the appellate process is to preserve its superior resources for a more finely screened
set of cases. Whether that screening occurs through the imposition of costs
that encourages litigants to self-screen, through preliminary assessments that
“take a peek” at case merits, or an algorithm that statistically summarizes
case probabilities of reversal makes little difference in terms of due process.
Third, when algorithms are used as an appellate screening mechanism,
courts can freely share them with the public. While litigants might be inspired to game algorithms if it provides them with an automated decision or
recommendation, there is significantly less benefit in attempting to game algorithms if the ultimate benefit is simply access to secondary review. A low
merit case would be even less likely to succeed at the appellate level than at
the initial stage, so the benefit of review would be insubstantial. With minimal concerns about litigant gaming, adjudication systems would have little
justification for keeping algorithms secret.92

89. Lakkaraju et al., supra note 29 (technical bias occurs when the dataset used for
the algorithm is not congruient with the population being assessed). When applied to prioritize cases, the dataset is the outcome of cases.
90. For a discussion of the selective labels problem, see supra Section II.B.
91. Freeman, supra note 18, at 140 (explaining that due process concerns typically
arise regarding the use of algorithms in pre-sentencing calculations). But, when
employed to screen for errors, the time at which due process concerns regarding algorithms has already passed.
92. Trade secrets are currently the most common justification for secrecy. But government now has the ability to access high-quality algorithms through public
competitions. For example, organizations like Netflix, Homeland Security, and
Microsoft have hosted competitions at Kaggle.com. John Mannes, The Kaggle
Data Science Community is Competing to Imporove Airport Security with AI,
TECHCRUNCH (June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/the-kaggledata-science-community-is-competing-to-improve-airport-security-with-ai/.
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Fourth, models of decision-making can be constructed for any adjudication system. As noted above, most adjudication systems do not have access
to an external outcome measure like criminal offending upon which to build
an algorithm that might guide decisions. But every adjudication system
should have a dataset of its own decisions, allowing for easy expansion of
algorithmic aid to almost any adjudication system.93
Finally, using algorithms to target cases for secondary review is largely
immune to the substantive allegation that algorithms can embed and cement
biases even when human decision-makers may evolve and change.94 Because
all merit decisions are ultimately in the hands of human decision-makers, the
algorithm can easily update with evolving human judgment: as long as algorithms are trained to be most predictive of contemporary decisions, models
will be only minimally tied to historical norms that a society may ultimately
conclude are biased and outdated. As judicial norms change, the data on
which algorithms are trained—the initial decisions of judges—can change
without being hampered by the guidance of an algorithm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Adjudication systems, notably in the area of criminal justice, are increasingly turning to data-driven algorithms in the hopes of improving decision-making. However, there are also growing concerns that algorithmguided decision making can embed racial biases, deprive parties of due process, and impair transparency. Rather than use algorithms to recommend or
even automate decisions, we have proposed using algorithms to reboot an
older and well-established system for improving the quality of legal decisions: appellate review. Implementing algorithms to target decisions for ap-

There thus seems little reason for relying on proprietors who claim trade secret
protections.
93. Some adjudication systems will face complications. We have two situations in
mind. First, the decision that an appellate court faces may be different than the
decision faced by the lower court due to deferential standards of review. The
challenge could likely be overcome by maintaining separate thresholds for
cases with different standards of review. For example, perhaps decisions that
would be reviewed de novo should be prioritized for review if they have a
degree of error greater than 0.5, while decisions facing a clearly erroneous style
should only be prioritized for review if they have a degree of error greater than
0.8. A second issue is presented when courts do not record the results of settlement. When lacking measurements of the outcome for certain cases, it makes it
more difficult to generate models of outcomes that are used to generate the
degree of error.
94. Lakkaraju et al., supra note 29 (technical bias occurs when the dataset used for
the algorithm is not congruent with the population being assessed). By training
the algorithms to be most predictive of more recent cases, the algorithm will
naturally update as the judicial preferences evolve.
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pellate review can still leverage the core benefits of predictive technology
while avoiding the most potent objections.

